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● Prosocial behavior fundamentally involves trading off costs to the self against rewards to the 
other. 
● Using a modified intertemporal choice task, we found that children chose to maximize reward 
(stickers), minimize opportunity cost (delay), and traded off between the two. 
● Children invested more time towards earning stickers for themselves, versus for another child. 
● Children’s tradeoffs in both other- and self-benefitting decisions followed a hyperbolic 
discounting function, qualitatively similar to those observed in human adults and non-human 
animals. 
Abstract 
Human prosocial behaviors are supported by early-emerging psychological processes that detect and 
fulfill the needs of others. However, little is known about the mechanisms that enable children to deliver 
benefits to others at costs to the self, which requires weighing other-regarding and self-serving 
preferences. We used an intertemporal choice paradigm to systematically study and compare these 
behaviors in 5-year-old children. Our results show that other-benefiting and self-benefiting behavior share 
a common decision-making process that integrates delay and reward. Specifically, we found that children 
sought to minimize delay and maximize reward, and traded off delays against rewards, regardless of 
whether these rewards were for children themselves or another child. However, we found that children 
were more willing to invest their time to benefit themselves than someone else. Together, these findings 
show that from childhood, other- and self-serving decisions are supported by a general mechanism that 
flexibly integrates information about the magnitude of rewards, and the opportunity costs of pursuing 
them. 
Introduction 
    Humans care about the welfare of others: We punish those who treat us or third parties poorly, 
make fair allocations of resources and expect others to do the same, and donate our money, time, and 
energy to help others with no expectation that the favor will be returned in kind. When engaging in these 
behaviors, we face the task of representing and comparing others’ welfare against our own  (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Buckholtz, 2015; Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Delton & 
Robertson, 2016). Here, we focus on helping—costly behaviors that deliver benefits to others—and 
investigate its origins in childhood. In deciding whether and how to help others, we have to consider the 
effort required to help, whether this effort is worth the reward, and whether the recipient of these rewards 
needs and deserves our generosity. What are the origins of these capacities? Do we begin as rational 
altruists, trading off our costs against others’ rewards, or do we learn to do so gradually, over years of 
interacting with and learning from others? 
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Developmental research demonstrates that the motivational and cognitive resources supporting 
cooperation emerge early. Children help others complete their goals (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Morris, 2013; 
Hepach, Vaish, Grossmann, & Tomasello, 2016; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Warneken, 2016), understand social norms like fairness (Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017; 
Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012) and are willing to pay a personal cost in order to help and share 
(McAuliffe et al., 2017; Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007). This vast literature 
demonstrates that our impulse to cooperate is at the core of our social development. What are the 
computational resources that support these abilities?  
Here, we build on proposals that children’s prosocial behavior is best thought of as a decision-
making process (Bridgers, Jara-Ettinger, & Gweon, 2016; Sommerville et al., 2018): one which integrates 
information about the cost of actions, the rewards they generate, and the social value of the other. 
Previous research provides evidence that the building blocks of reward- and cost-sensitive decision 
making emerge early in development: Infants and young children tend to pursue the shortest path to a 
goal (Paulus & Sodian, 2015), search a location that has more rewards (Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 
2002), plan reaches in accord with how much effort their actions will require (Upshaw & Sommerville, 
2015), are more willing to help when less physical effort is required (Sommerville et al., 2018), and are 
more likely to teach other people things that are high in reward and difficult to learn (Bridgers et al., 
2016). Children are also sensitive to temporal delay as a cost (Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013; Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), suggesting that they consider not only physical effort, but also opportunity 
cost (the loss of time available to pursue other rewards), in their action planning. Furthermore, children’s 
own ability to delay rewards has been shown to predict their tendencies to engage in costly sharing 
(Garon, Johnson, & Steeves, 2011; Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997), suggesting that children’s own 
action planning is related to their prosocial behavior. Lastly, children adjust their cooperative strategies 
based on who benefits from their actions (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2013; Moore, 2009), suggesting that they also take social value into account when deciding 
whom to benefit.  
The above research, conducted in children across different age groups and using different tasks, 
show that as soon as children are able to plan actions in the world, they plan over variables like cost and 
reward to cooperate with and help others. Here, we present a case study within this framework, and ask 
how and whether children trade off between delay and reward. Studies of human adults reveal tradeoffs 
between these factors in both prosocial and self-serving decisions: People adjust the value of monetary 
rewards based on its temporal delay in self-serving decisions (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; 
Laibson, 1997) and trade off rewards delivered to another person against how socially distant that other 
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person is (Delton & Robertson, 2016; Jones & Rachlin, 2006). What function (Figure 1) expresses 
children’s discounting strategies, both when they work to benefit themselves and others?  
This question has been extensively studied in human adults (for a review, see Berns et al., 2007) 
and non-human animals (Kacelnik & Marsh, 2002; Mazur & Biondi, 2009; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & 
Hauser, 2007; Santos & Rosati, 2015). Specifically, two functions have been proposed to describe the 
tradeoff between reward and delay: hyperbolic (Eq. 1) and exponential discounting (Eq. 2). 
฀ =  ฀
1+฀฀ (1) 
฀ =  ฀−฀฀ (2) 
In the above equations, V refers to subjective value, A to reward, D to delay, and k to an individual’s 
discounting factor. Specifically, k describes how steeply a person trades off reward against delay: 
Individuals who are less patient are thought to measure higher on this parameter. The key distinction 
between hyperbolic and exponential discounting is that exponential discounting assumes time-consistent 
preferences. Unde exponential discounting, the difference in subjective value of a reward between now 
versus next week is the same as the difference in value between 52 and 53 weeks from now, whereas 
under hyperbolic discounting, the former difference is greater than the latter. Many past studies ask which 
of these functions best describes the mechanisms of temporal discounting, and consensus from behavioral 
economics is that hyperbolic discounting provides a better fit to people’s decisions (Berns et al., 2007; 
Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Laibson, 1997) 
Present Research 
In summary, previous research suggests that children are adept action planners and precocious 
cooperators, but no research to date provides a systematic analysis of the mechanisms underlying self- 
and other-benefitting choices in young children. To investigate these questions, we chose to study 
children at an age where they demonstrate some patience under delay (Kidd et al., 2013; Mischel et al., 
1989) and robust prosocial behavior (for a review, see Warneken 2016). We developed a series of tasks 
that aimed to assess whether children (1) choose to minimize delay and maximize reward and (2) trade off 
between these two factors in both self-serving and prosocial decisions. Based on the evidence reviewed 
above, we predicted that children would be rational deciders -- minimizing delay, maximizing reward, 
and trading off delay against reward, regardless of whether their actions benefited themselves or someone 
else. Furthermore, we predicted that children would invest more time towards their own rewards. Lastly, 
our study design allows us to make inferences about the functions that describe children’s discounting 
behaviors. 
Methods 
Participants. N = 32 five-year-old children (M = 5.56 years, range = 5.03-5.98, 16 girls) were 
recruited and included in our final sample. Sample size was determined through a simulation power 
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analysis on the effect of delay on discounting decisions from a pilot experiment (alpha = .05, two-tailed, 
desired power = .8). Four additional children were tested, excluded, and replaced due to experimenter 
error. Recruitment and experimental procedures were approved by the Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects at Harvard University. 
Materials. Figure 2 illustrates the setup of the experiment: one central table, where decisions 
were made; 2 payoff tables, where children waited for rewards; and a toy, which incentivized children to 
view delay as an opportunity cost. One payoff table was consistently associated with lower delays and 
rewards, side and color counterbalanced across children, and the tables were marked with blue and yellow 
signs to help children remember which was which. On every trial, cards displaying the delays associated 
with each decision were placed on each corner of the decision table, and sticker rewards were placed at 
the payoff tables. To encourage children to view the delays of the game as costly (a methodological 
challenge we encountered during piloting), we introduced two toys that children could play with after 
they completed (1) Delay and Reward decisions, and (2) Discounting decisions.  Cards with 0 to 18 
squares indicated the delays of each option, where each square represented a five-second delay. A 
stopwatch was used by the experimenter to keep track of delays. Children rated various aspects of the 
game (e.g. stickers, waiting) on a seven-point Likert scale (Fig S2).  Children deposited all rewards 
earned during the game into a box at the decision table. 
Design. We randomly assigned children to earn sticker rewards for themselves (self condition) or 
for another participant (other condition). The experiment featured 3 kinds of decisions (Figure 3): Delay 
decisions, which hold reward constant, Reward decisions, which hold delay constant, and Discounting 
decisions, which vary delay across a constant ratio of rewards. Children engaged in 4 Delay decisions, 
where they chose to earn 1 sticker after no delay or after {2, 4, 6, 8} five-second units of delay, 4 Reward 
decisions, where they chose to earn 0 or {1, 2, 3, 4} stickers with no delay, and 10 Discounting decisions, 
where they chose to earn 1 sticker after no delay or 2 stickers after {0, 2, 4 … 18} five-second units of 
delay. These delays, though far shorter than those from experiments testing decisions in human adults, 
allowed us to test children across many trials, using real, experienced delays rather than hypothetical 
ones. See Figure 3. 
         We counterbalanced whether the Reward or Delay decisions came first, which table was 
designated as the higher reward and delay location (left or right, blue or yellow), which table was 
introduced first during decisions (left or right), the order of comprehension check questions and Likert 
scale questions, and the first anchor presented (-3 or +3) during Likert ratings across participants. 
Procedure. First, the experimenter introduced an exciting ball machine asked children to rate the 
toy on the Likert scale by asking “How do you feel about the red zigzag machine? Do you really like or 
really don’t like it or somewhere in between? Can you point to a face and show me?” Before each 
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decision, children were reminded that they had to choose one of the options presented before eventually 
gaining access to the toy. Children rated the toys very highly (M1=2.77, SD1=0.67; M2=2.75, SD2
Next, children received an endowment of stickers in a paper bag. Children learned that these 
stickers were earned for them by a previous participant, and were told that in the current game, they will 
earn additional stickers for themselves (self condition) or for another child “just like you, who also likes 
stickers,” coming at some other time to play the game (other condition).  Children were naive to how 
many stickers were in their endowment until after the experiment.  
=0.57). 
Then, children were introduced to the study setup, where they could choose to wait some length 
of time, for some number of stickers, for either themselves or another child.  To convey different amounts 
to delay to children, the experimenter showed the child a card corresponding to each option, where one 
square on the card referred to a 5-second delay. For instance, children saw a card with 4 blue squares on a 
particular trial and learned that “at the blue table, you’ll have to wait 4 times [20 seconds] before you can 
take the stickers from the blue table and put them into the box...”. To familiarize children to the full range 
of delays in the experiment, children were also asked to wait the minimum and maximum delay (0 and 90 
seconds, respectively). 
On every decision trial, children chose to sit at one of the two payoff tables in order to earn the 
stickers at that table. The experimenter timed the delay using a stopwatch told children that waiting is a  
“quiet part of the game”. If children spoke during delays, the experimenter reminded them of the rules. 
After completing the delay, children deposited the stickers from that trial in a box, and returned to the 
central table. If children chose an option with no delay, the stickers were available as soon as they sat 
down. A secondary experimenter then replaced the stickers and cards for the next trial, and the 
experiment continued.  
Children made 4 Delay decisions (holding reward constant) and 4 Reward decisions (holding 
delay constant). Children then rated the delays and rewards in the game and answered comprehension 
questions about the setup of the Discounting decisions: (1) which table always has more and which table 
always has less stickers (probing their reward discrimination), (2) which table always requires more and 
which table requires less waiting (probing their delay discrimination), and (3) who the stickers were for: 
themselves or the next participant. In the other condition, we also asked (4) whether the next participant 
was real or pretend. The experimenter provided corrective feedback to all questions. Children then made 
10 Discounting decisions: choices between earning 1 sticker now, or 2 stickers after a delay. 
At the end of the experiment, children were asked to explain their decision-making strategy 
(“How did you decide which table to choose in this game?”). Responses were coded for mention of the 
delay (e.g. “I didn’t like waiting”) and rewards (e.g. “I wanted to get more stickers”). Ambiguous 
responses (e.g. “This one has more and this one has less”) were coded conservatively as mentioning 
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neither delay nor reward. At the end of the session, children in the other condition passed on all of their 
earned stickers to the next participant, and children in the self condition were asked to donate 6 stickers to 
the next participant. These endowments were then passed forward within conditions to ensure that all 
subsequent participants started out with some reward, regardless of assignment to condition. 
Data Coding and Analysis. All responses were coded online, except for children’s explanations, 
which were transcribed and coded offline from video. All decisions including minor experimenter error (1 
Delay decision, 2 Reward decisions, and 1 Likert rating of a toy) were conservatively excluded from the 
analyses. To assess the reliability of all measures, videos from decisions and explanations in 25% of the 
sessions were randomly selected, cut to remove all information about assignment to condition, and re-
coded by an additional researcher who was naïve to the hypotheses of the experiment. The coders agreed 
on 100% of responses.  Data and analysis scripts can be accessed via the Open Science Framework at 
https://osf.io/k5twy/. 
         We used the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R (Team, 2015) to 
implement all linear mixed effects models and generalized linear mixed effects models. We fit three 
classes of models: (1) null models, including intercepts only, (2) hypothesis-driven models, including 
additional theory-driven predictors like reward and delay, and (3) exploratory models that include 
additional non-theoretically driven predictors like gender. All models with repeated measures included a 
random intercept for participant identity. All reported p-values are two-tailed, and all t-tests use 
Satterthwaite approximation to degrees of freedom. Bracketed values indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
In cases where models were nested, we used likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) to assess model fit. In all other 
cases, we assessed fit using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We used the ggplot2 package 
(Wickham, 2009) to produce Figures 4 and S3-S5.  
Results 
Comprehension Checks. All participants correctly answered all comprehension questions 
regarding the Discounting decision setup. All except 2 participants (94%) correctly identified the recipient 
of the rewards. All children randomly assigned to earn stickers for the next participant affirmed that the 
recipient was real, not pretend. 
Delay and Reward Decisions. We found that during Reward decisions, wherein children chose 
between more and less rewards at equal delay, children chose to maximize rewards, [2.157, 8.872], 
B=3.602, SE=1.214, p=.003, OR= 36.672, and were equally likely to do so for themselves (93.55% of 
decisions) than another child (90.63%), [-2.348, 3.408], B=0.488, SE=1.074, p=.650, OR=1.629. We also 
found that during Delay decisions, wherein children chose between equal rewards at more or less delay, 
children chose to minimize delay, [1.165, 2.817], B= 1.384, SE=0.281 p<.001, OR=3.989, and were 
marginally less likely to choose the smaller delay when earning rewards for  themselves (71.43%), versus 
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another child (85.94%), [-1.955, 0.008], B=-0.906, SE=0.469, p=.054, OR=0.404. Children were no more 
likely to make reward-maximizing decisions as payoffs increased, [-0.312, 1.088], B=0.333, SE=0.340, 
ß=0.374, p=.328, OR=1.395. Similarly, children’s tendencies to minimize delay held across increases in 
delay, [-0.123, 0.271], B=0.071, SE=0.099, p=0.474, OR=1.074. See Figure S1. 
Discounting Decisions. Children chose to maximize rewards and minimize delays independently, 
but did they trade off between these two variables? A set of hypothesis-driven models were fit to assess 
whether children’s decisions (1) were affected by the recipient manipulation, (2) changed over length of 
delay, and (3) followed a hyperbolic function.  
A hypothesis-driven model adding the predictors of untransformed delay length (0, 2, 4….18 
five-second units) and recipient (self versus other) revealed that children were less likely to choose the 
higher delayed reward as its delay increased, [-0.286, -0.157], B=-0.218, SE=0.033, ß=-1.253, p<.001, 
OR=0.804, and more tolerant of delays when earning rewards for themselves, [0.800, 3.673], B=2.136, 
SE=0.699, p=0.002, OR=8.466. This model provided a better fit than the null model, X2
An explicit comparison of children’s discounting parameter, k (Kirby, 2000), across conditions 
revealed that children discounted less steeply in the self condition (M=0.035, SD=0.026) than in the other 
condition (M=0.058, SD=0.034), [-0.045, -0.001], B=-0.023, SE=0.011, ß=-0.726, t(30)=-2.172, p=.038. 
In sum, children made traded off delay against reward during both self- and other-benefitting decisions, 
but were generally less tolerant of delays when earning stickers for another child versus themselves. 
(2)=71.513, 
p<.001. An additional model fitting an interactive effect between recipient and delay indicated that 
children’s discounting functions did not differ across conditions, [-0.024, 0.222], B=0.097, SE=0.062, 
ß=0.557, p=.121, OR=3.808. See Figure 4 for decisions across children and Figure S5 for individual 
decisions. 
         What mathematical function best describes children’s discounting behavior? To ask whether 
children’s sensitivity to delay during discounting is best expressed as a linear, hyperbolic, or exponential 
function of delay length, we compared three models using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): the above 
model including untransformed linear delay, D, a second model including a hyperbolic function on delay 
(Eq 1), 1/1+D, and a third model including an exponential function (Eq 2) on delay, e-D.1
                                                
1
 Because rewards (1 versus 2 stickers) were constant across all discounting decisions, and individual 
differences were captured by a random effect for participant identity in our model, we set these two 
factors (A and K; see Eq 1-2) to a constant. 
 A comparison of 
model AICs revealed that the hyperbolic model (313.19) provided better fit for decisions than both the 
linear (323.84) and the exponential (438.04) model. An exploratory model including subjective value 
under hyperbolic discounting and 2 additional predictors, age in months and sex, revealed that girls were 
more patient than boys, [0.534, 3.207], B=1.776, SE=0.646, p=.006, OR=5.906, and no effect of age, [-Au
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0.111, 0.244], B=0.065, SE=0.085, ß=0.243, p=.449 OR=1.067. This model provided a better fit than the 
simpler hyperbolic model by a likelihood ratio test, X2
In summary, we found that (1) children were less willing to invest time towards stickers for 
others versus themselves (2) both kinds of decisions involved tradeoffs between delays and rewards, and 
(3) a hyperbolic function best captured their discounting functions across conditions. 
(2)=7.986, p=.018.  
Exploring the predictors of children’s discounting strategies. What variables explain 
children’s discounting behavior?  We tested whether children’s valuation of the delays and rewards in the 
experiment (measured by their Likert ratings of stickers and waiting) and their reported strategies 
(measured by verbal explanations of their decision-making process) explain variance in their discounting 
behavior. However, these measures were generally not predictive of children’s discounting decisions 
above and beyond the subjective value of the rewards and who these rewards were for. The only positive 
finding from this analysis revealed that children who reported thinking about the stickers during their 
decisions (e.g. “Because the blue table has more stickers than the yellow table”, “Because I just wanted 
more stickers”) were more likely to choose the higher, delayed reward, [0.277, 3.353], B=1.728, 
SE=0.741, p=.020, OR=5.628. For full results from this model, see Table 1. See Supplemental Material 
available online for additional analyses of children’s subjective ratings and reported strategies. 
Discussion 
Human cooperation is supported by early-emerging motivations to deliver benefits to others at 
costs to the self. We used an intertemporal choice task to investigate the cognitive mechanisms that 
support these tradeoffs in childhood. We found that children sought to minimize delay, maximize reward, 
and traded off between delay and reward during both self- and other-benefitting decisions.  We also found 
that children were less willing invest time if someone else’s stickers were at stake, suggesting that they 
trade off reward against delay more steeply for prosocial than self-serving decisions. Lastly, we found 
that like human adults (Berns et al., 2007) and non-human animals (Kacelnik & Marsh, 2002; Mazur & 
Biondi, 2009; Rosati et al., 2007), children’s discounting strategies were captured by a hyperbolic 
function on the delay of this reward that expresses its subjective value. These results build on past work 
showing that our abilities to plan and cooperate emerge in early childhood, and contribute a mechanistic 
proposal for how costs and rewards are integrated in children’s self- and other-benefitting decisions. 
This research raises questions about the fundamental mechanisms of prosocial behavior. First, our 
results do not reveal whether children shifted their valuation of reward, delay, or both, when making self- 
versus other-benefiting choices. Although we did not observe a relationship between children’s Likert 
ratings of reward and delay and their discounting behavior, it is possible that other measures of value may 
help to clarify the computations that supported children’s decisions. We also do not claim that hyperbolic 
discounting provides a perfect and complete explanation for children’s decisions. Our findings suggest 
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that hyperbolic discounting provides a better fit to the data relative to other functions, and future studies 
can enrich our understanding of the quantitative tradeoffs underlying children’s decision-making. 
Next, our case study does not address the question of how children discount reward by social 
value, or how much they value other people’s utilities relative to our own.  Research in human adults 
suggests that we discount others’ rewards by their social value (Albrecht, Volz, Sutter, Laibson, & von 
Cramon, 2011; Delton & Robertson, 2016; Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Strombach et al., 2015), and 
developmental work can further investigate how children integrate social and temporal distance in their 
prosocial decisions.  
More generally, his work supports the possibility that from an early age, patience is not only a 
growing resource (Atance & Jackson, 2009; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Harbaugh, Krause, & Berry, 
2001) but also one that is strategically deployed based on context (Kidd et al., 2013). Further studies of 
the flexibility of intertemporal choice, and prosocial decision-making more broadly, can reveal how we 
come to represent time as a precious resource and delay as a cost. While we suggest that children’s 
representation of value over time follows a hyperbolic function, our study leaves open whether other 
kinds of cost, like physical or mental effort, would trade off against reward in the same way.  
Finally, these results leave open the origins and development of this mechanism. Are the 
decision-making processes recruited by infants and toddlers in previous studies of prosocial behavior the 
same ones used by children in this task? How do culture and circumstance shape these mechanisms? 
Studies charting this task space across different populations and across development can clarify the 
development of the competencies that these tasks are meant to measure. Overall, these results demonstrate 
that by early childhood, children recruit a decision-making process for both self-serving and prosocial 
action that integrates many sources of information. Children appear to engage in rational altruism, a 
process that is supported by early-emerging motivations to benefit others at a cost to the self, and 
tradeoffs between how much good they can generate, and at what cost. 
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Figure 1. Functions that describe the (a) linear, (b) hyperbolic, and (c) exponential effect of delay on the 
subjective value of a reward.  
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Figure 2. Experimental setup. On every trial, an experimenter (E) presents choices to the child (C) at a 
central table, including the delays and rewards of each option. After the child makes a choice, she sits at 
either Table 1 or Table 2, waits the amount of delay associated with that table, and then places the stickers 
earned at that table in a box to take home. All choices were made under an opportunity cost: a fun toy was 
displayed between Tables 1 and 2, which the child could play with only after finishing the experiment. 
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Figure 3.  Overview of the hypothesis-driven measures in the experiment, listing the respective payoffs, 
and an example of stimuli presented to children. Squares presented on cards indicated the length of delay, 
where each square represented 5 seconds of delay. 
 
Figure 4. Children’s choices for a higher, delayed reward over a smaller, immediate reward, across length 
of delay from 0 to 18 five-second units (0 to 90 seconds) across the other and self conditions (total N = 
320 decisions), fit using a binomial smoothing function. Individual choices are plotted in black with 
random jitter. Raw proportions are plotted as grey bars. Ribbon indicates 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 1. Summary of full model for predicting discounting behavior (0 = 1 sticker now, 1 = 2 stickers 
after a delay). All continuous variables were centered. The baseline levels for the predictors are other for 
recipient, male for sex, and absent for mention of delays and rewards. Goodness of fit measures and 
random components of variance are listed below. 
Fixed effect B SE z p 95% CI OR 
Intercept 1.383 0.658 2.101 .036* 0.110, 
2.844 
3.988 
Recipient 1.593 0.651 2.444 .015* 0.342, 
3.039 
4.916 
Subjective 
value 
1.640 0.296 5.542 <.001**
* 
1.131, 
2.304 
5.156 
Sex 1.704 0.617 2.759 .006** 0.517, 
3.071 
5.493 
Age in months -0.141 0.319 -0.443 0.657 -0.811, 
0.516 
0.868 
Mentioned 
delays 
-0.808 0.591 -1.366 0.172 -2.066, 
0.392 
0.446 
Mentioned 
rewards 
1.728 0.741 2.330 .020* 0.277, 
3.353 
5.628 
Delay Likert 
rating 
0.151 0.375 0.403 0.687 -0.635, 
0.925 
1.163 
Reward Likert 
rating 
0.026 0.324 0.081 0.936 -0.621, 
0.719 
1.026 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, all two-tailed 
Model AIC = 309.4 ; BIC = 347.1; log-likelihood = -144.7 ; deviance = 289.4 
Number of participants: 32, ∂2
  
=1.408 
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